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Abstract
The National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel aims to partially replace petroleum diesel consumed in Brazil 
by biodiesel. PNPB costs are subsidized by government and diesel consumers, based on economical, environmental and 
social benefits. Rules and incentives have been created in order to create a sectoral innovation system congruent with 
PNPB ś objectives. Nevertheless, PNPB didn´t reach its goals, especially social policy goals. The paper analyzes PNPB 
by applying public policy analysis methodologies. Top-down and bottom-up approaches have been adopted. Top-down 
approach investigates PNPB ś conception, focusing Program ś rules and results expected by formulators. Bottom-up 
approach investigates PNPB ś execution, focusing public/private actors enrolled on PNPB. Shortcomings identified are 
mainly related to the coordination of public/private actors and the Program ś goals.
Keywords: public policies evaluation; biodiesel; sectoral systems of innovation; social policies.
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Introduction
“[…] I always say for those people who talk to me: in my 
opinion, the biggest project in Brazil at the moment is the 
biodiesel project. It has been conceived to steer the North-
east region development, above all the poorest regions, 
through castor oil crops. Of course, biodiesel can be made 
from soybeans or palm oil in the North Region. However, in 
the poorest regions of Brazil, we want to boost the castor 
oil plantations in order to generate thousands and thou-
sands of jobs. As I always say: a job gives the human being 
its dignity” (Quoted from President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva 
speech in 2005).
The speech quote reproduced above reveals much of the 
expectations generated by the National Program for Pro-
duction and Use of Biodiesel (PNPB), a public policy imple-
mented in the first mandate of President Lula (2003-2007) 
with the primary objective to generate income for farmers 
and rural workers that live in the poorest regions of Brazil. 
These farmers would boost their income by providing raw 
materials to biodiesel production. By making mandatory the 
blend of 2% of biodiesel in all petroleum diesel consumed in 
Brazil, it was expected to generate economical benefits by 
diversifying energy sources, and environmental benefits by 
reducing the emissions of pollutant gases.
The launching of PNPB has been followed by an intense ad-
vertising campaign: the Brazilian energy corporation Petro-
bras in an advertising forecasted that economically excluded 
farmers could “raise energy”. The President Lula da Silva, in 
national and international meetings, distributed biodiesel 
samples and castor oil seeds. Between 2004 and 2010, twen-
ty four presidential speeches dealt with the PNPB, twelve of 
them in biodiesel plants inaugurations, according to informa-
tion available at the press agency of the Federal Govern-
ment web’s page (Secretaria de Imprensa da Presidência da 
República, n.d.).
In order to fulfill PNPB purposes, the Program managers 
have created a regulatory framework that establishes rules 
and incentives, including the mandatory use of biodiesel 
blends, tax exemptions to producers, financial funding to re-
search institutions and facilitated credit to support biodiesel 
plants investments, as well as for the acquisition of equip-
ment fueled by biodiesel.
Six years after the Program launching, PNPB did not achieve 
the main objectives established in the Program. The great 
increase biodiesel industrial production was only possible 
by the participation of big commodities producers, mostly 
soybeans producers. Most of the investments in biodiesel 
plants are concentrated in commodities production regions, 
not in the poorest regions excluded by the commercial 
agrobusiness market. The big biodiesel plants use imported 
technology. Environmental and economic benefits are highly 
questionable. Finally, biodiesel production costs do not allow 
its price to be competitive with petroleum diesel prices, and 
biodiesel still requires subsidies to enter the fuels market. 
Taking into consideration these problems, it is quite difficult 
to justify the subsidies paid by consumers and the govern-
ment to make feasible biodiesel insertion on the Brazilian 
fuels market.
The present paper aims to explain the causes of PNPB 
shortcomings, applying public policy analysis methodologies 
(Hogwood and Gunn, 1984) to describe and analyze con-
ception, implementation, and execution of PNPB. To do so, 
the objectives proposed on the Program´s conception have 
been compared with the Program´s execution and results, as 
proposed by Pressman and Wildavsky (1984). This has been 
made by a top-down perspective analysis, focusing on the 
central actors enrolled with the conception and implemen-
tation of PNPB, and by a bottom-up perspective analysis, fo-
cusing on peripheral actors enrolled in the Program execu-
tion. These two perspectives of investigation made possible 
to understand how the content of PNPB has been modified 
by peripheral actors during its execution, generating unex-
pected results and frustrating some of the central actor’s 
expectations. The innovation policy characteristics of PNPB 
also made possible to study the Program as a coordinated 
effort aiming to create a sectoral innovation system (Maler-
ba, 2002) centered in the biodiesel industry.
Besides this introduction, the paper has been structured in 
five sections. The second section discusses the logic and pol-
icy instruments applied in biofuels insertion policies, which 
includes a short description of the policies implemented 
in countries that are leading the world biodiesel produc-
tion. The third section describes and analyzes the Brazilian 
Program, using the legal and policy documents of PNPB´s 
conception and implementation (top-down analysis). The 
fourth section of the paper describes the features and ac-
tions of public and private actors, both central and periph-
eral, that are relevant to the execution of PNPB (bottom-up 
analysis), and highlights the incongruences of these actors’ 
actions related to the goals established at the PNPB offi-
cial documents. Finally, the last section presents the paper´s 
conclusions.
Biofuels support public policies: a critical review of 
their logic and more frequently used instruments 
Since the beginning of the 1990’s, several countries have re-
activated policies adopted after the second oil shock of 1979. 
Nowadays these policies aim not only to diversify energy 
options, but include the goals of dynamizing the agroindustry 
sector and reducing environmental impacts that result from 
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and financial resources, and legitimating new technologies by 
positive externalities generation (Bergek et al., 2008).
In most of the cases, biofuels diffusion policies combine two 
kinds of interventions: 1. Direct interventions: tax incentives, 
mandatory use of biofuel blends, funding for industrial and 
research investments, regulatory framework; 2. Indirect in-
terventions: incentives for specific agroindustries, financial 
funding to adapted equipments purchases (Rajagopal and 
Zilberman, 2007). 
With no claim to completion, three objections can be made 
to the idea that State is as an entity capable of correcting en-
ergy markets failures by building innovation systems: 1. The 
idea that any organization could perfectly correct market 
failures is an unrealistic one, since these failures are inher-
ent to market economies (Silva, 2009); 2. The assumption 
that the State has perfect knowledge of all variables neces-
sary for policy success, including the prediction of results, 
does not considers that all public policies generate unex-
pected results (Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984); 3. The State 
is not neutral in its intervention policies, since the content 
of these policies depends on negotiation between interest 
groups that aim to maximize private benefits from the policy, 
generating government failures such as the State capture by 
private interests, clientelism and nepotism (Castro, 2002). 
By pointing out government failures and the unpredictability 
of public policies results, the intention here is not to rec-
ommend a free market/liberalization policy approach based 
on “laissez faire, laissez aller, laissez passer” orientations on 
energy markets, where government intervention is essential. 
The recommendation proposed here is that the top-down 
implementation of biofuels policy could be improved by a 
bottom-up approach, which means a construction of a new 
conception that could include the participation of a variety 
of actors relevant to the biofuel industry development.
Despite government failures pointed in this article, public 
policies are behind the huge increase of world biodiesel 
production, from 11 million liters in 1991 to one billion lit-
ers in 2001 (Azevedo, 2010). This growth on production has 
become steady since 2003, when more aggressive biofuels 
diffusion policies were implemented in the European Com-
munity countries (EC) and in the United States. In 2008, 
the top five biodiesel producers of the world were Ger-
many (25.4% of the biodiesel world output), United States 
(20.96%), France (16.35%), Brazil (9.46%) and Argentina 
(8.65%) (Azevedo, 2010). Chart 1 shortly presents the main 
policies adopted in these countries referring to biodiesel dif-
fusion (not including Brazil).
Recently, some of these biodiesel policies have been limited 
by restrictive measures. In EC, concerns related to the envi-
energy consumption, lowering fossil fuels consumption and 
thus “decarbonizing” the energy matrix (Grübler and Naki-
cenovik, 1996). 
Among available alternatives, biofuels are frequently the tar-
get of public policies, due to the biofuels potential for gen-
erating positive environmental and social impacts, political 
feasibility. Also, due to similarities with petroleum fuels, it is 
possible to use the already existent distribution and con-
sumption infrastructure.
International policy experience shows that the diffusion of 
biofuels depends on government support to be competi-
tive with the lower prices of petroleum fuels. In order to 
overcome such market barriers, government interventions 
are conceived according to a neoclassical conception of the 
State as an “omniscient entity”, capable of maximizing so-
cial welfare, correcting market failures, generating techno-
logical learning and minimizing uncertainties (Rajagopal and 
Zilberman, 2007). 
In Neoclassical theory, market failures addressed by biofu-
els public policies are necessary, first and foremost, to cor-
rect the non-internalization on the prices of energy of social 
and environmental costs generated by the production and 
consumption of petroleum fuels. Secondly, neoclassical con-
ception considers biofuels policies a mechanism to counter-
balance the monopoly power of petroleum fuels producers 
on energy markets, breaking the technological lock in that 
prevents the adoption of alternative fuels (Unruh, 2002).
Based on these arguments, neoclassical approaches for 
biofuels policies conception plainly justify government and 
consumers subsidies to the development of alternative fu-
els industries. Even the raise of fuels prices, according to 
this view, is considered the monetization of not accounted 
externalities generated by the prevailing energy systems. 
Moreover, biofuels policies are based on optimistic predic-
tions that the costs of biofuels have a natural tendency to 
decrease as the result of virtuous cycles of learning, pushed 
by government actions to generate technological knowledge, 
such as the funding of research (technology push), and the 
creation of new protected markets (demand pull), based on 
measures such as the mandatory use of new fuels (Nemet, 
2008). The combination of technology push and demand pull 
policy tools is considered a powerful induction mechanism 
to learning on sectoral innovation systems (Malerba, 2002) 
centered on biofuels technologies. The components of these 
systems are supposed to perform specific functions on the 
development of these industries induced by public policies 
(Hekkert et al., 2007; Bergek et al., 2008). These functions 
include generation and diffusion of knowledge, influence on 
technological change direction, promotion of industrial in-
vestment, creation of new markets, mobilization of human 
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Top-down analysis of PNPB
Programs for biodiesel diffusion in Brazil were settled in the 
1980s, motivated by the oil shocks in the 1970s (Azevedo, 
2010). Nevertheless, these initiatives had little impact on es-
tablishing a biodiesel industry, and were phased out. It was 
not until the 2000s that biodiesel came back to the pub-
lic policy agenda, influenced mainly by policies implement-
ed in developed countries. In 2002, the Brazilian Program 
for Technological Development of Biodiesel (Probiodiesel) 
was launched by the Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MCT). In 2003, the “Program Green Fuel: Biodiesel” was 
launched by the Ministry of Mines and Energy (Gazeta 
Mercantil, 2002a).
The main difference between PNPB and these two pro-
grams is PNPB´s inter-ministry structure. The Program has 
been conceived by the Presidential Office and put into op-
eration by the Civil House of the Presidency, a President’s 
advisory office. In 2003, an inter-ministerial working group 
coordinated by the Civil House was created by a Presiden-
tial Decree, in charge of evaluating the viability of biodiesel 
use and of providing a forum for debates with members 
ronmental impacts of biofuels production led to the creation 
of the 28/2009 Directive which recommends the adoption 
of criteria to certify that subsidized biofuels are economical-
ly, environmentally and socially sound. In addition, the Direc-
tive determines greenhouse emissions to be reduced in 50% 
by 2017. In Germany, the 2007 Energy Tax Act determines a 
progressive increase of taxation on biofuels (EurObserv´ER, 
2009). The results of the Energy Tax Act were an increase on 
the idle capacity on German biodiesel production (85% in 
2008), the reduction of production or bankruptcy of 70% of 
German biodiesel producers and the pashing out of biodies-
el sales in 14% of the fuels stations in the country (Mabee 
et al., 2009). In the United States, phasing out of the Blender 
Tax Credit motivated the National Biodiesel Board (NBB) 
to call the United States Senate to extend the subsides, in 
order to prevent the biodiesel industry bankruptcy.
The aforementioned impacts of restrictive measures clearly 
shows how biofuels industry is dependent on government 
subsidies. This dependence puts into question the forecasts 
perception of sustainability from the biodiesel industry by 
learning processes and costs reductions. This conception 
questions are the same in the Brazilian Program´s concep-
tion documents, discussed in the next section.  
Chart 1. Policies for biodiesel diffusion on European Comunity and he top four world biodiesel producers (not including Brazil).  




Common Agricultural Policy (1992) allowed bioenergy crops to be grown on set aside lands. The EC 30 Directive 
(2003) created goals for the partial replacement of petrol fuels used for transport purposes by biofuels (2% until 
2006, 5.75% until 2011). The EC 96 Directive (2003) authorized EC member countries to give tax incentives to 
biofuels producers. The Energy Crop Scheme (2003) authorized the payment of 45 euros by hectare of energy 
crops grown on set aside lands. Research and development programs include the Altener Program (2005); the Sixth 
Framework Program projects (17.5 billion euros applied in biofuels projects between 2002 and 2006), the Seventh 
Framework Program projects (53.2 billion Euros between 2007 and 2013). In 2003, diesel fuels specification on the 
EC changed to include 5% of biodiesel. Also in 2003, a 6.5% tax is charged on imported biodiesel, and the EC specifi-
cations of biodiesel (EN 14214) have been created.  
Germany Tax exemptions for biodiesel were established in 1993. In 1994 biodiesel specifications were determined (DIN V 
51606 standards), updated in 1997. In 1999, increased petroleum fuels taxes were established, exempting biodiesel 
(1999) and 5% biodiesel blends (2004). The Biofuel Quota Act (2007) made mandatory the blend of a 4.4% of bio-
diesel on petroleum diesel that should increase to 6.25% in 2009 and 8% in 2015.
France In 1992, increased petroleum fuels taxes were established, exempting biodiesel. In 2000, a fixed amount of biodiesel 
was permitted to commercialization free of taxes. The General tax on pollution-generating activities (2005) for fuels 
resellers gave tax exemptions of 33 euros for each 100 liters of biodiesel added to petroleum diesel in 5% blends, 
predicting a reduction on this discount to 8 euros in 2011.
United States Clean Air Act and Comprehensive Energy Policy Act (1992) promoted government vehicles fleet conversion to 
alternative fuels, including biodiesel. In 1994 the National Biodiesel Board was created. In 1997 tax incentives for 
converted vehicles were settled by the Clean Air Act. The American Society for Testing and Materials established 
biodiesel specifications in 2001. The Blender Tax Credit (2004) gave tax exemptions to producers and distributors 
(US$ 1 per gallon of biodiesel made from agricultural oils, and US$ 0.50 per gallon of biodiesel made from waste oils 
or animal fats). The Renewable Diesel Tax Credit (2005) created additional tax incentives to producers and distribu-
tors of biodiesel blends.
Argentina The Competitiveness Plan for Biodiesel Fuels (2001) established tax incentives and government purchases of bio-
diesel for a 15 years period. In 2007, the Biofuels Law made mandatory the blend of 5% of biodiesel on all petroleum 
diesel commercialized in the country by 2011. 
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In September 2004, the Brazilian Presidency of the Re-
public launched Provisional Measure (MP) Nr. 214/04. MP 
Nr. 214/04 established that ANP should be responsible for 
regulating the production and use of biodiesel, generating 
deadlines for achieving a certain mixture of biodiesel in pet-
rodiesel. In addition it was determined that the National 
Council of Energy Policy (CNPE) should monitor the mar-
ket insertion of the product and instituted a tributary model 
and mechanisms for social certification. The MP was an issue 
intensely discussed on Brazil´s Congress: 18 amendments 
were proposed to alter the MP, including the mandatory use 
of biodiesel blends, which was not included on the origi-
nal proposal. In fact, the mandatory use of biodiesel blends 
was included in the Program as a result of lobbying activi-
ties by the Brazilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries 
(Abiove). The newspapers debate between defenders and 
opponents related to the mandatory use of fuel blends in 
Brazil was analyzed by Azevedo (2010)
The Provisional Measure has been consolidated by Law 
Nr. 11.097/2005. This Law changed previous laws [Laws Nr. 
9.478/1997, Nr. 9.847/1999 and Nr. 10.636/2002] related to 
the liquid fuels industry, and made the addition of biodiesel 
to commercialized oil diesel mandatory in Brazil, beginning 
with a 2 % proportion as of 2008 (B2 Diesel) and 5 % (B5 
Diesel) starting in 2013. Additionally, Law Nr. 11.097/2005 
authorizes the National Council of Energy Policy (CNPE) 
to change the mandatory deadlines according to factors re-
lated to raw materials supply, biodiesel processing capacity, 
participation of small farmers, reduction of regional inequali-
ties, technical problems faced by final devices users, and ad-
equacies to industrial policies. 
The MP Nr. 227/2004 implemented tax incentives, defining 
that taxation of biodiesel could never be superior to taxation 
of petroleum diesel. The MP also determined differentiations 
in tax exemptions according to the type of raw oil used in 
production, size of supplier farmers and region where the oil 
crops are cultivated. The tax reductions could reach 100%, 
in the case of castor oil and palm oil small producers on the 
North, Northeast and semi-arid regions of Brazil.
The Presidential Decree Nr. 5.297/2004 established the 
‘Social Fuel Seal’, a certification label that assures tributary 
advantages and access to financial credit for biodiesel pro-
ducers, besides being a requirement for producers wishing 
to participate in ANP public auctions of biodiesel. In order 
to be certified, companies must purchase a proportion of 
their raw material from farmers registered in Pronaf (Na-
tional Programme for Expansion of Family Agriculture) and 
provide them technical assistance. 
The MP also determined that the biodiesel market should be 
controlled by ANP, responsible for authorizing the produc-
of congress and representatives of the biodiesel network 
(research, agriculture, fuel and engine manufacturers, etc.). 
The viability study was elaborated by the working group and 
members of the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation 
(Embrapa), National Institute of Technology (INT), National 
Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), Bra-
zilian Association of Vegetable Oil Industries (Abiove), Bra-
zilian Automotive Engineering Association (AEA), Brazilian 
Association of Automotive Vehicle Manufacturers (Anfavea), 
farmers associations, congressmen and researchers (Grupo 
de Trabalho Interministerial, 2003).
In December 2003, the report produced by the working 
group was sent to the Civil House, and recommended the 
development of a biodiesel program based on international 
policy experiences, on the existence of Brazilian public and 
private institutions capable to lead biodiesel industry, and on 
environmental (decrease on vehicles emissions), economic 
(reduction of petroleum diesel imports) and social benefits 
(jobs creation in the poorest regions of Brazil).
The economic reasoning  in favor of Brazil´s biodiesel Pro-
gram can be questioned if taking into consideration the 
growing production of petroleum diesel in Brazilian refiner-
ies. Besides, the production of  biodiesel requires to increase 
methanol imports, the main non-agricultural input used in 
the biodiesel production [according to Medrano (2007), 
methanol used corresponds to 8% of the volume of bio-
diesel output] with a very small production in Brazil, which 
is dependent on imports of this product (Azevedo, 2010). 
The environmental benefits reasons are questionable by the 
non-existence of any regulatory measure to control envi-
ronmental impacts of the agricultural raw materials cultiva-
tion (Garcez, 2008). Furthermore, the alleged reduction on 
fuel burning emissions is not significant with the use of low 
concentration biodiesel blends, between 2% and 5%, pro-
posed by the Brazilian Program (Medrano, 2007).
Based on the highly questionable reasoning of the report, in 
2003 a Civil House Decree has created an Inter-ministerial 
Executive Comission for Biodiesel (CEIB) that was in charge 
of elaborating, implementing, and monitoring a biodiesel 
insertion program (Grupo de Trabalho Interministerial, 
2003). The CEIB was composed by members of the Social 
Communication Secretariat and 30 ministers. In addition, 
a management group was settled to implement the strat-
egies proposed by the CEIB. The management group was 
coordinated by the Ministry of Mines and Energy and was 
composed by Brazil’s National Bank for Economic and Social 
Development (BNDES), the National Agency of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas and Biofuels (ANP), Petrobras (Brazilian Petro-
leum Corporation) and the Brazilian Agricultural Research 
Corporation (Embrapa).
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and semi-arid regions; 3. In 2008, the taxation for biodiesel 
production with raw materials supplied by big farmers was 
reduced, making less attractive to contract raw materials 
supply from small farmers; 4. In 2008, the Social Fuel Seal 
certification regional criterion for raw materials acquisition 
was also altered. The requirement for biodiesel producers 
to acquire 50% of agricultural oils from family farmers on 
the Northeast and semi-arid regions dropped to 30%; on 
the other side, the requirements for North e Central-West 
regions have raised from 10% to 15%. It is important to high-
light that the Central-West region of Brazil is a consolidated 
agribusiness region, predominantly occupied by industrial 
farmers. The North of Brazil is an expansion region, also 
with a strong presence of big farmers. The average size of 
big farms in the Northeast region is 177 hectares; in the 
North region, 609 hectares; in the Central-West Region, 944 
hectares (Azevedo, 2010).
Bottom-up analysis of PNPB
Public-Sector Groups in the Brazilian Biodiesel 
Industry  
The group of public actors with first importance for the 
implementation of PNPB are Federal Government Minis-
tries. Even though 13 Ministries are formally participants in 
the Program, only six have performed actions directly re-
lated to PNPB. Information about Ministries measures has 
been gathered from government publicly available planning 
documents, specifically at the Plurianual Government Plans 
(PPAs) reports, Federal Government covenants and con-
tracts, and the Transparency Portal of Federal Government 
(Azevedo, 2010). 
In the 2004-2007 and 2008-2011 PPAs, twelve biodiesel re-
lated actions have been identified, with a forecasted invest-
ment of US$ 380 million. According to information available 
in the PPAs reports, 35.7% (US$ 136 million) of all scheduled 
resources was spent on execution; 38.4% had to be shared 
among Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food Supply 
(MAPA); 19% were designated to the Ministry of Agrar-
ian Development (MDA); 3.7% to the Ministry of Science, 
Technology and Innovation (MCTI).The Ministry of Mines 
and Energy (MME) and the Ministry of National Integration 
(MI) did not spend any biodiesel budgetary resource, even 
though these Ministries had resources scheduled on PPA.
Federal Government expenses on Covenants for the bio-
diesel Program reached US$ 16 million, spent in 41 cove-
nants in the period 2004-2008. MCTI have spent 51.9% from 
the total amount in 16 covenants; MDA, also in 16 covenants, 
has spent 31.6% of the total; MME signed three covenants, 
summing up 9.4% of the resources spent; MI also signed 
three covenants that absorbed 5.9% of total resources; and 
tion of biodiesel in mixtures above 2 % for self-consumption 
and for private fleets. ANP for also responsible for setting 
quality standards (specifications and methods for testing). 
The CNPE Resolution Nr. 3/2005 also settled that biodiesel 
produced to be blended with petrodiesel should only be 
sold by industrial facilities in public auctions promoted by 
ANP. The maximum amount of biodiesel traded, as well as 
the reference prices, are also determined by ANP. The refer-
ence prices are the maximum price that producers should 
charge for their products in public auctions; distributors 
(buyers) acquire the biodiesel with the lower prices charged.
The public auctions aims to assure that the amount of bio-
diesel necessary for the mandatory blend is made by certi-
fied producers, making easier to ANP to control the market 
and the quality standards of the fuel (Pezzo, 2009). Between 
2005 and 2010, ANP has promoted 18 public auctions, assur-
ing the blend of biodiesel during this period, corresponding 
to more than 5 million cubic meters of biodiesel.
Despite the steady increase in biodiesel output production 
since the beginning of the Program, the execution of PNPB 
caused changes in the original conceived policy project, for 
example, reducing the incentives of small farmers participa-
tion in the supplying of alternative raw materials such as 
castor oil or palm oil [both castor oil and palm oil are crops 
typical from the poorest regions on Brazil, the North and 
Northeast regions]. The mandatory use of blends, not rec-
ommended on PNPB conception step, became one of the 
Program´s key instruments, and was subject of changes sev-
eral times due to lobbying activities by the biodiesel and 
vegetable oils industries (Brito, 2008; Tenório, 2009): CNPE 
Resolution Nr. 2/2008 determined that the amount of bio-
diesel in petroleum diesel should rise from 2% to 3% in 
2008; CNPE Resolution Nr. 2/2009 increased the amount to 
4% in 2009; CNPE Resolution Nr.6/2009 implemented the 
use of 5% blends in 2010. The mandatory use of biodiesel 
blends required to biodiesel industry to purchase a huge 
amount of vegetable oils and fats in a short period of time 
(four years), and this volume could only be provided by big 
farmers. As a result big farmers are the main suppliers of fats 
and vegetable oils for biodiesel production, thus impairing 
PNPB´s goals of including small farmers in the Program.
In fact, the Social Fuel Seal rules were modified in a harm-
ful way to achieve the social inclusion purposes of PNPB in 
four different times: 1. In 2007, due to the low offer of oils 
and fats in the market, the Social Fuel Seal was no longer 
a requirement for producers´ participation in ANP´s pub-
lic auctions. As a result, about 15% of biodiesel acquired in 
18 public auctions between 2005 and 2010 has been sup-
plied by producers without social certification; 2. In 2008 the 
100% tax exemptions, once restricted to castor oil and palm 
oil biodiesel, has been extended to any agricultural raw ma-
terial produced by family farmers on the North, Northeast 
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225 million (0.25% of the total investment scheduled). Be-
tween 2010 and 2014, US$ 200 million (0.18% of the to-
tal investment scheduled by Petrobras) were planned for 
biodiesel investments. 
In 2006 Petrobras began the construction of three biodiesel 
facilities in the Northeast and semi-arid regions (States of 
Bahia, Ceará and north region of Minas Gerais). The invest-
ment in these three units reached US$ 115 million (Queiroz, 
2007). The facilities were built by Intecnial, a Brazilian indus-
trial construction company that uses technology licensed by 
the United States Company Crown Iron Works (Petrobras, 
2010). Two facilities begun operations in 2008 and in 2009. 
By the end of 2009, Petrobras acquired 50% of the private 
biodiesel factory Bsbios (located in the Paraná State, on 
South Brazil), with an investment of US$ 28 million. In 2006 
Petrobras invested US$ 10 million in two experimental bio-
diesel facilities in Rio Grande do Norte State, located in the 
Northeast region of Brazil (Queiroz, 2007). The investments 
of Petrobras in biodiesel facilities located on Northeast Bra-
zil (the poorest region on Brazil) pointed that the company 
is one of the Government instruments used in order to 
achieve social inclusion aims of  PNPB.
In 2008 a subsidiary company, Petrobras Biofuels, was 
launched to manage biodiesel and ethanol projects of Petro-
bras. Petrobras Distributor, a subsidiary for fuels distribu-
tion, has invested US$ 18 million in logistics and adaptation 
for fuel distribution (Martins, 2007). Petrobras also invests 
in Research and Development in a project named Technol-
ogy Program on Renewable Energy (Proger), established in 
2004. Petrobras is the top Brazilian institution in biodiesel 
patents registration: between 2003 and 2010, 12 biodiesel 
Petrobras´s patents (out of 20 Brazilian patents) have been 
registered in patents offices in foreign countries; 11 patents 
have been registered during the same period in the Brazil-
ian patents office, from a total of 192 patents deposits (32 
from foreign institutions and 160 from Brazilian institutions) 
(Azevedo, 2010).
Notwithstanding the huge investment of Petrobras in in-
dustrial biodiesel activities, the more important function of 
Petrobras in the PNPB is the acquisition of biodiesel at the 
public auctions promoted by ANP. On the 18 public auctions 
promoted by ANP, Petrobras and its subsidiary Refap (Alber-
to Pasqualini Refinery) were the only companies that bought 
biodiesel, at higher prices than those of petroleum diesel. The 
public auctions rules determine that only producers and im-
porters of diesel that have more than 1% of participation on 
the diesel market are obliged to acquire biodiesel, what in ef-
fect makes  Petrobras e a Refap the only companies obliged to 
buy biodiesel in ANP´s public auctions. The biodiesel bought 
by the company is subsequently transferred to fuels distribu-
tors for blending with petroleum diesel. 
MAPA was responsible for 0.9% of the resources spent, in 
three covenants. The external institutions with the higher 
amount of covenant resources have been first universities 
and research institutes, followed by agricultural producers 
associations, Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
dealing with social services, State Governments Secretariats 
of Science and Technology and Municipalities.
Between 2004 and 2010, biodiesel related to Ministries con-
tracts reached the amount of US$ 1.5 million. Most of these 
expenses (82%) were directed invested in research projects 
and in acquisition of biodiesel equipment by Ministries oper-
ational bodies. The remaining amount (18%) has been spent 
in operating expenditures, advertising, and events. 
It is important to highlight the significant amount of federal 
financial resources spent by MCTI through its agencies: the 
Financing Agency for Studies and Projects (Finep) and the 
National Council for Scientific and Technological Develop-
ment (CNPq) (Azevedo, 2010). Between 2002 and 2009, 
these two agencies invested in 368 biodiesel research pro-
jects, spending a total amount of US$ 65 million (32% spent 
by CNPq and 68% by Finep) (SIGCTI, 2010). Before the im-
plementation of PNPB (2002 to 2004 period), only seven 
biodiesel research projects have been funded by Finep and 
CNPq, totalizing a total amount of US$ 1.4 million.  Biodiesel 
related projects were responsible by 1.95% of all the re-
sources spent by Finep and CNPq between 2002 and 2009, 
most spent after PNPB´s implementation (Azevedo, 2010). 
Most of MCTI´s resources were spent in projects developed 
by institutions located in the Northeast region, coherently 
with the priority given to this region on PNPB conception. 
Institutions of the Southwest and South regions were re-
sponsible for 74.83% of total resources. Projects supported 
by CNPq were carried out by universities (86.95%) and 
research institutes (13.05%). Projects funded by Finep had 
the participation of universities (45.93%), research institutes 
(29.05%), private companies (22.95%), State Governments 
Secretariats of Science and Technology (1.11%) and State 
Government Foundations for research support (0.96%).
The budget analysis of Federal Government Ministries ac-
tions reveals a great emphasis placed on Science and Tech-
nology development with high participation of research in-
stitutes and universities as Ministries budget shows.
A second public actor essential to PNPB execution is 
Petrobras, the Brazilian publicly traded Petroleum Corpo-
ration controlled by Brazilian Federal Government. Petro-
bras business plans had scheduled investments in biodiesel 
since 2008. In the period of 2008 to 2012, US$ 218 mil-
lion were scheduled in biodiesel (corresponding to 0.39% 
of the total investment scheduled by Petrobras); in the 
2009-2013 period, the scheduled investments reached US$ 
19
ISSN: 0718-2724. (http://www.jotmi.org) 
Journal of Technology Management & Innovation © Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Facultad de Economía y Negocios.
J. Technol. Manag. Innov. 2013, Volume 8, Special Issue ALTEC.
tory blends has been successfully achieved, the growth of 
biodiesel industry did not promote the regional develop-
ment and the social inclusion aims proposed on the concep-
tion and formulation of PNPB. The mismatch between ex-
pected objectives and results achieved by the Program will 
be described in the next section, which addresses actions of 
private actors in the Brazilian biodiesel industry. 
Private-Sector Groups in the Brazilian Biodiesel 
Industry  
The first private-sector actors group in order of impor-
tance for PNPB is the agroindustrial complex related to 
oil and fats production and processing. The group is com-
posed by small farmers, big farmers and fats and vegetable 
oils industry. 
Despite government´s incentives for the production of al-
ternative oil crops (castor oil and palm oil), between 2008 
and 2010, 79.03% of the Brazilian biodiesel production was 
made from soybeans oil; 15.17%, from beef tallow, and 3.33% 
from cotton oil. Other oils had less than 1% participation on 
biodiesel production during this period. Thus, it is very clear 
that the oils and fats used in Brazilian biodiesel production 
are by-products of export oriented commodities (soybeans, 
beef and cotton), produced by big farmers or by small farm-
ers already integrated into organized agroindustrial com-
mercial chains (Azevedo, 2010). 
The proportion of biodiesel produced from family farm-
ers´ raw materials in the public auctions promoted by ANP 
shows the small participation of small farmers excluded in 
the commercial markets. In the 11 States enrolled in the 
Program, where family producers supplied agricultural oils 
to biodiesel production in 2008, only in the Rio Grande do 
Sul State (a region where family farmers are commonly in-
tegrated into agro-industrial commercial chains) there was 
a satisfactory participation of family farmers in the process 
of supplying oil to biodiesel facilities, reaching 61.39% of 
the State´s production of raw material designated to the 
biodiesel facilities. In Goiás State (a region of agroindustry 
in central-west Brazil) family farmers participation reached 
24.65%, and in Mato Grosso State (also an agro-industry 
zone in the central-west region) family farmers supplied 
9.84% of the raw material used on the State biodiesel fa-
cilities in 2008. In the Santa Catarina State (south Brazil re-
gion) the family farmers supply reached 2.27%, and in Pará 
State (North region), 1.16%. On the remaining States [Minas 
Gerais, Bahia, Ceará, Piauí, Rio Grande do Norte and Per-
nambuco], family farmers participation did not reach 1% in 
the production of raw materials used by biodiesel facilities 
(Leite, 2009). It is noticeable that the States where family 
farmers’ participation was greater were those located in 
regions that lead soybeans production in Brazil: the central-
On the other hand, Petrobras activities in the biodiesel in-
dustry could be considered a strategic investment, neces-
sary to the absorption of knowledge related to new energy 
sources. In fact, nowadays this is a very common strategy 
of petroleum companies that are investing in biofuels as a 
diversification strategy (Eikland, 2006). 
State governments are the third relevant group of public 
actors in PNPB. The creation of State Programs was one of 
the action guidelines of PNPB made in order to decentral-
ize biodiesel decisions and to create regional networks of 
public and private institutions in accordance with PNPB´s 
goals. The perceived benefits for State Governments par-
ticipation on the PNPB includes opportunities to receive 
federal funds to finance industrial, agricultural, energy, so-
cial and environmental State policies through local biodiesel 
programs. In 2004 an agreement between the ministries of 
MCTI, MME and State Foundations for Research Support 
allowed transference of Federal Funds (from the Sectoral 
Funds and from the Program for Amazon Investments) to 
State programs. Twenty one States received Federal funds, 
for State Secretariats, Foundations and Research Institutes 
(Azevedo, 2010).
Nevertheless, it is not fair to say that the covenants and 
Federal resources transfers led to the creation of a stable, 
enduring and institutionalized State biodiesel programs. A 
considerable share of Federal resources was directed to 
short-lived projects (24 months) executed by research in-
stitutes and universities, based on the erroneous concep-
tion that the overcoming of specific technological problems 
would be sufficient to turn biodiesel State programs viable. 
This erroneous conception of self-sufficient technological 
development is noticeable on Federal Government actions, 
which consider that the funding of R&D measures could au-
tomatically generate innovations transferable to sectors of 
society. This is quite evident in projects funded by Finep with 
the objective of structuring State programs. Most of these 
projects are merely research projects focused on very spe-
cific problems, with the absence of market and institutional 
concerns, essential for the creation of long lasting and im-
pactful policies. For instance, the projects for biodiesel pilot-
units construction in Northeast region (Pernambuco, Rio 
Grande do Norte and Ceará States) has not been enough 
to assure the construction of any private biodiesel factory 
to be supplied by local oil crops farmers. Neither university 
projects on the poorest regions were able to change the 
tendency of the Brazilian biodiesel industry to be located 
in regions where the commodities agro-industry is stronger 
(as shown in the next section of the paper). 
The analysis of public institutions actions on the PNPB makes 
clear that these are not sufficient to achieve PNPB´s goals. 
Even though the biodiesel production capacity for manda-
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ties crops oils (soybeans and cotton) are the raw materials 
that produce the less costly biodiesel in Brazil, according to 
Barros et al (2006). 
Big producers of commodities are more integrated to the 
vegetable oils processing industry, making easier to estab-
lish supply contracts with biodiesel facilities. The same oc-
curs with the family farmers that supply raw materials to the 
biodiesel industry. As shown in the previous section of this 
paper, the South and Central-West regions farmers are the 
main suppliers for the biodiesel industry. Soybean oil is the 
most used oil due to the low agronomic risks of soybeans 
crops and to the reduced needs of technical assistance for 
farmers. Finally, the dynamics of agro-industrial chains of 
commerce is reproduced in the biodiesel industry, because 
many of the biodiesel production facilities are owned by tra-
ditional agro-industry sector companies. 
The second group of private-sector actors in importance for 
PNPB is the biodiesel production companies, in fact a new 
industry shaped after the launching of PNPB.  Since 2005, 
but especially between 2007 and 2008, an investment boom 
in new biodiesel facilities occurred. In 2007, the production 
of facilities authorized by the ANP increased in 578% over 
2006. Out of 36 companies that announced investments, 
23 did so between 2007 and 2008. This huge increased in-
vestment in biodiesel facilities was caused by expectations 
of biodiesel use (B2) that become mandatory in 2008. The 
number of biodiesel facilities increased from eight facilities 
in 2005 to 64 in 2010, with a production installed capacity 
that increased from 85 thousand m3 per year to more than 
5 million m3 per year. Nowadays, the biodiesel industry is 
a highly organized one, counting with institutions that are 
very active in the defense of the sector´s interests. The more 
important of these institutions are the Brazilian Association 
of the Biodiesel Industries (Abiodiesel), founded in 2005, and 
the Brazilian Biodiesel Union (Ubrabio), established in 2007. 
ANP classifies Brazilian biodiesel facilities by their size, rang-
ing from small (production capacity limited to 35,560 m3 
of biodiesel per year), medium sized (limited to 126,000 
m3 per year) and large size (biodiesel production superior 
to 126,000 m3 per year). 17 large facilities hold 68.76% of 
west region produced 48.1% of the Brazilian soybeans out-
put in 2008, and the south region 34.48%. Also, these two 
regions concentrate 77.5% of Brazilian soybeans processing 
capacity (Azevedo, 2010). Not by chance, in 2008 95.94% of 
the agricultural oils supplied by family producers for bio-
diesel production in 2008 were soybean oil (Leite, 2009).
The significant participation of agricultural commodities on 
biodiesel raw materials commercialization can be explained 
by their highly organized markets and to the steady techni-
cal improvements on agricultural techniques for these crops. 
The situation for alternative crops is not the same, as shown 
by production and productivity data (Chart 2):   
There is no official data related to the participation of family 
farmers on palm oil production. Nevertheless, data gathered 
from the biggest national producers in the States of Pará and 
Bahia allows the conclusion that this is a crop dominated by 
big farmers. In Pará State, the Agropalma Group had in 2010 
32,000 hectares of palm plantations (Azevedo, 2010), 64.5% 
of the State´s total of palm crops. In Bahia State, palm oil 
is processed by 4 companies that rule palm oil productive 
chain (Leiras, 2006). Castor oil problems include the low 
absorptive capacity for technical improvements and difficul-
ties for obtaining funding and insurance (Garcia, 2006). This 
situation creates a vicious circle: producers are not able to 
absorb technical improvements due to their lack of financial 
resources, which they cannot obtain due to their techno-
logical gaps. This vicious circle has not been broken by the 
incentives to castor oil crops promoted by Brazil´s Federal 
Government (Azevedo, 2010).
The predominant utilization of agricultural commodities 
by-products for biodiesel production can be explained by 
the additional advantage of reducing costs and risks of com-
mercial crops, by adding a new market to by-products. Thus, 
the soybeans crops, aimed at producing soybeans meals, 
have on the biodiesel market an option for commercializ-
ing the by-product soybean oil. The same occurs for beef 
producers (that sells beef tallow for biodiesel facilities) and 
cotton oil (a by-product of cotton crops, directed to fib-
ers production). This is one of the reasons why commodi-
Chart 2. Biodiesel crops, production and productivity  growth rates, Brazil, 2004-2008
Source: Azevedo (2010)
Crop Production Productivity
Soybeans + 22.3% + 16.7%
Cattle slaughtering +8.1% + 19.8%
Cotton +4.96% +14.1%
Palm Oil Plant +20% +1.84%
Castor Oil Plant -12% -3.6%
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The number of facilities related to agroindustry companies 
helps to explain the prominence of agro-industry productive 
chains on the Brazilian biodiesel business, especially soybeans 
and beef tallow produced in the Central-West and South re-
gions. The facilities owned by agro-industry companies use 
their own raw materials, or buy it from already integrated 
producers. This evidence reinforces the thesis that one of 
the main difficulties for PNPB´s social inclusion objectives 
comes from the dynamics of biodiesel raw materials market, 
which reproduces agro-industry markets dynamics. 
Regarding the industrial processes adopted by Brazilian bio-
diesel facilities, it is worth to investigate in detail the transes-
terification technologies adopted by Brazilian facilities. Oils 
and fats transesterification processes are the more widely 
used technologies for biodiesel production. The most com-
mon transesterification routes are methanol transesterifi-
cation (using 8% of methanol of total biodiesel output on 
the process) and ethanol transesterification (using 12% of 
ethanol) (Azevedo, 2010). On both routes, the alcohol used 
becomes a component of the biodiesel produced. Most of 
Brazilian biodiesel production capacity (78.97%) is based on 
methanol transesterification; 17.74% of the capacity belongs 
to mixed facilities (facilities that can use either methanol 
or ethanol); only 3.29% of Brazil´s biodiesel production 
capacity is installed on ethanol transesterification facilities 
(Azevedo, 2010). Since 8% of the final biodiesel produced 
is composed by the alcohol used on the transesterification 
process, the predominance of the methanol route on Bra-
zilian facilities brings up at least two disadvantages. Firstly, 
methanol in Brazil is produced mainly from natural gas, a 
fossil fuel, endangering the renewable character of Brazilian 
biodiesel (in fact, it can be said that almost 8% of all biodiesel 
produced in Brazil is a fossil fuel). Secondly, Brazil is a net 
importer of methanol, reducing the economic advantages 
of biodiesel production as a strategy to reduce expenses on 
petroleum diesel imports. In fact, Brazil´s methanol imports 
have grown 4.72% between 2006 and 2007, 13.55% between 
2007 and 2008, 21.55% between 2008 and 2009 and 27.57% 
between 2009 and 2010. These numbers provide strong evi-
dence that the mandatory use of 2% biodiesel blends since 
2008 provoked an increase in methanol imports by Brazil 
(Azevedo, 2010).
Brazil´s total biodiesel production capacity. Medium sized fa-
cilities hold 24.32% of Brazilian biodiesel production capac-
ity in 17 facilities. Small sized facilities hold 6.92% of the total 
productive capacity in 30 facilities. All this 64 facilities have 
been authorized for operation by ANP, but only 29 facilities 
(13 large facilities, 13 medium-sized and three small) are cer-
tified by the Social Fuel Stamp, holding 75.74% of the Brazil´s 
total biodiesel production capacity (Azevedo, 2010). Region-
al distribution of Brazilian biodiesel facilities in 2010, as well 
as Brazilian regions´s participation on Brazil´s biodiesel out-
put between 2005 and 2010 are described in Chart 3.
As Chart 2 shows, few biodiesel facilities have been installed 
in the poorest regions of  Brazil (North and Northeast), 
and most of the installed facilities belong to Petrobras. As 
stated before in this paper, Petrobras is one of the Federal 
Government instruments used to achieve the social aims of 
the Program. Besides, Petrobras is an integrated petroleum 
company, making possible to the company to absorb losses 
in its biodiesel business, compensated by petroleum produc-
tion revenues. On the other side, companies dedicated ex-
clusively to biodiesel production installed in the Northeast 
region had serious business problems, and maintained their 
operations by the acquisition of agricultural raw materials 
supplied by agro-business emergent producers from North-
east, such as the cotton and soybeans producers in Bahia 
State (Azevedo, 2010).
The companies that own biodiesel facilities can be divided 
into three core businesses: agro-industry, independent pro-
duction and biodiesel facilities supply (Azevedo, 2010). 26 fa-
cilities, that hold 59.3% of Brazil´s total biodiesel production 
capacity, are agroindustrial companies (oil seeds processors, 
beef processors and large farmers cooperatives). 28 facilities 
(39.19% of Brazil´s total biodiesel production capacity) are 
independent ones, established exclusively for biodiesel pro-
duction. Three small facilities can be classified as equipment 
suppliers, focusing on biodiesel facilities sales, and using their 
own facilities as demonstration units. Finally, the small fa-
cility Nutec (Ceará Industrial Technology Foundation) be-
longs to Ceará State Government, and it is in fact an experi-
mental small facility, with production capacity of 864 m3 of 
biodiesel per year. 
Chart 3. Regional distribution of biodiesel facilities and biodiesel production, Brazil, 2005-2010
Source: Azevedo (2010)
Region Brazil´s installed capacity in % Number of facilities National biodiesel output in % (2005-2010)
Central-West 41.38% 29 40.49%
South 25.08% 9 25.52%
Sotheast 17.34% 15 16.76%
Northeast 11.76% 7 14.17%
North 3.07% 6 3.08%
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The public-sector actors in charge of the policy execution 
(service deliverers) have proved not to be sufficient to as-
sure PNPB´s social inclusion objectives.
Ministries actions analyses have firstly shown that some 
Ministries that could be very relevant for PNPB´s social and 
environmental targets (such as the Ministry of Environment 
and the Ministry of Labor and Employment) have only a 
formal participation in the Program. Besides, the Ministries 
that developed actions on the PNPB have worked with small 
budget resources. Scheduled actions have had a small pro-
portion of financial execution, and were much focused on 
R&D academic projects, whose results (if any) have not been 
transferred to the Brazilian biodiesel industry, especially to 
the actors located in the poorest Brazilian regions.
Petrobras, the Brazilian Petroleum Corporation, proved 
to be an essential actor for PNPB, especially in the acqui-
sition of the biodiesel sold at the ANP´s public auctions. 
Nevertheless, its participation in the biodiesel industry is 
limited to the creation of medium-sized facilities that use 
imported production technology, although in the poorest 
regions of Brazil.
Brazil´s States policies reinforce the conclusions related to 
the public-sector actors actions on the PNPB. Several States 
have been funded by Finep to boost State programs, which 
were merely isolated research projects, insufficient to gen-
erate a local biodiesel industry on these States. It is quite 
clear that the success of the biodiesel industry in Brazil´s 
States depends on the existence of the commodities agro-
industry, the more important factor affecting investment de-
cisions of private actors in the biodiesel industry.       
 
The agricultural raw materials producers situation shows 
that PNPB did not accomplished the goals of social inclu-
sion of family farmers in the poorest regions of Brazil. The 
main suppliers of raw materials for the Brazilian biodiesel 
industry are big soybeans producers on the more developed 
agro-industrial regions in the country, that grow crops in big 
farms. The family farmers that supply raw materials to bio-
diesel facilities are those family farmers already integrated 
into the export agro-industries (soybean producers of the 
Central-West and South regions of Brazil). The participation 
of family farmers that grow alternative raw materials in the 
poorest regions of Brazil is nearly non-existent. The investi-
gation on Brazilian biodiesel facilities also pointed out to the 
lack of social inclusion on the PNPB. Most of the biodiesel 
production capacity and output is concentrated on facilities 
located on the Central-West and South regions. Moreover, a 
big proportion of biodiesel facilities are agro-business com-
panies, what reinforces the tendency these companies have 
to contract suppliers already integrated to the agro-industry.
Another problem of the Brazilian biodiesel facilities are the 
Another problem is the utilization of imported technolo-
gies in the majority of Brazilian facilities.  Even Petrobras´ 
facilities were built with technology licensed from the Unit-
ed States Company Crown Iron Works. Other suppliers 
of technology to Brazilian facilities are the Italy Company 
DeSmet Ballestra, and the Germany Company Westfalia, as-
sociated to the United States Company Archer Daniel Mid-
land (ADM). Those companies have supplied at least thirteen 
biodiesel facilities in Brazil, which hold 48.41% of the total 
biodiesel Brazilian production capacity. Due to difficulties 
on information related to the technology used by Brazilian 
biodiesel facilities, Azevedo (2010) considers this estimative 
of imported technology participation underestimated, what 
means that certainly the imported technology participation 
on Brazilian biodiesel industry is higher.
The only big company that supplies biodiesel units in Bra-
zil is the Company Dedini, traditional in the production of 
equipment for alcohol distilleries, and provider of biodiesel 
technology licensed by DeSmet Ballestra. Other Brazilian 
facilities suppliers are small companies, mainly start-ups cre-
ated in universities and small processor of oilseeds and sug-
arcane that consider the biodiesel industry an opportunity 
to business diversification (Azevedo, 2010).
Besides making clear the Brazilian industrial gap in large bio-
diesel facilities technologies, the numbers shown above are 
evidences of unexpected results that arise from the man-
datory use of biodiesel blends by PNPB. This unexpected 
effect was the need to import technology to produce bio-
diesel in large scale in a short period of time (four years), a 
requirement for providing the amount of biodiesel neces-
sary to accomplish the mandatory blend targets. The short 
time necessary to achieve those targets made impossible 
for national industries to develop indigenous biodiesel 
production technologies. 
Conclusions
The National Program for Production and Use of Biodiesel 
(PNPB) is a public policy aiming to create a sectoral system 
of innovation that could make feasible the insertion of bio-
diesel in the Brazilian energy matrix, in an environmentally 
correct way, promoting social inclusion with economical fea-
sibility. In order to achieve these purposes, a set of rules 
and institutions has been created aiming to induce public 
and private actors to develop actions in synchrony with 
PNPB´s objectives.
Nevertheless, the Program´s implementation, making man-
datory the use of blends in a short period of time (four 
years), associated with the changes in its social inclusion 
rules jeopardized the Program´s more important target: the 
inclusion of small farmers of the poorest Brazilian regions.
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technological routes adopted. The methanol transesterifica-
tion technology, used in the majority of Brazilian biodiesel 
plants, can be considered not adequate to the Brazilian 
conditions. Firstly, this technology requires the use of a fos-
sil fuel, since methanol used in Brazil is made from natural 
gas. Secondly, methanol in Brazil must be imported, making 
more desirable the adoption of the ethanol transesterifica-
tion route. Furthermore, the investigation on biodiesel fa-
cilities equipments suppliers hass shown a high participation 
of imported technologies, which explains the predominance 
of methanol transesterification technology. The use of im-
ported technology was a result of the need for fast growing 
of Brazil´s biodiesel production, required to accomplish the 
production targets that made feasible the mandatory blend 
of biodiesel in petroleum diesel.
The bottom-up analysis of the Program has shown much 
of PNPB´s problems and unexpected results, caused by ac-
tor’s power asymmetries and by changes introduced on the 
Program´s conception instruments. Most of these changes 
were induced by lobbying activities of peripheral actors, 
powerful enough to influence central actor’s decisions. 
Three central problems have been identified on the bottom-
up analysis: first, the predominance of public-sector actors 
actions on R&D activities, considered a “magic bullet” that 
could solve all the biodiesel industry problems; secondly, the 
low participation of the poorest family farmers; thirdly, the 
creation of an industry inadequate to Brazilian conditions, 
dependent on imported technologies.      
The analysis of conception, implementation and execution 
of PNPB in this paper has demonstrated that the Program´s 
shortcomings are a combination of technical, economical, 
political and social factors. These shortcomings combined 
made impossible the execution of PNPB on the way con-
ceived by the Program´s coordinators. Generally speaking, 
public and private actor’s power asymmetries and changes 
in technical and economic contextual factors (including the 
Program rules changes) are the main factors that make dif-
ficult to PNPB´s coordinators the achievement of the objec-
tives stated on the Program conception documents. 
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